The Cognitive Underpinnings of Bias in
Forensic Mental Health Evaluations by Neal, Tess M. S. & Grisso, Thomas
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Publications of the University of Nebraska Public
Policy Center Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska
2014
The Cognitive Underpinnings of Bias in Forensic
Mental Health Evaluations
Tess M. S. Neal
University of Nebraska Public Policy Center, tneal2@nebraska.edu
Thomas Grisso
University of Massachusetts Medical School, thomas.grisso@umassmed.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicypublications
Part of the Applied Behavior Analysis Commons, Criminology Commons, Other Psychology
Commons, and the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Public Policy Center, University of Nebraska at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska
- Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Publications of the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Neal, Tess M. S. and Grisso, Thomas, "The Cognitive Underpinnings of Bias in Forensic Mental Health Evaluations" (2014).
Publications of the University of Nebraska Public Policy Center. 135.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/publicpolicypublications/135
Mr. Jones, a 24-year-old man facing a felony charge 
of cocaine trafficking, had been convicted of four pre-
vious offenses (assault and battery, theft, trespassing, 
and giving a false name to a police officer). He had 
never before received psychiatric treatment, but his at-
torney requested an evaluation of his client’s mental 
status at the time of his alleged offense. Converging ev-
idence indicated (among other things) that Mr. Jones 
was influenced by his antisocial peers, his substance 
abuse was impacting his relationships at the time of 
the crime, and he had a history of several head inju-
ries resulting in loss of consciousness. After hearing 
the case, the court found Mr. Jones Not Guilty by Rea-
son of Insanity (NGI).
Now please rank the following six categories of mental ill-
ness in order of the likelihood that, at the time of the offense, 
Mr. Jones met diagnostic criteria for each. Use 1 for most and 6 
for least likely.
__ Affective Disorder
__ Personality Disorder
__ Mental Retardation/Intellectual Disability
__ Substance Use Disorder
__ Psychotic Disorder
__ Dissociative Disorder
The question in this vignette is straightforward for readers 
who know the relative likelihood of various mental disorders 
in defendants found NGI. Defendants with psychotic disorders 
are the most likely to be found NGI, and defendants with per-
sonality disorders are among the least likely to be found NGI 
(Cochrane, Grisso, & Frederick, 2001; Warren, Murrie, Chauhan, 
Dietz, & Morris, 2004). Given the fact that Mr. Jones was found 
NGI, the “base rates” of the various disorders in the NGI popu-
lation should have weighed heavily in the decision task. How-
ever, we provided stereotypic information about Mr. Jones that 
did not fit with the NGI research data. In fact, we intentionally 
designed Mr. Jones as an “anti base-rate character” (see Kahn-
eman, 2011) to illustrate one kind of cognitive bias, the repre-
sentativeness heuristic, which we discuss below in more depth 
along with other kinds of biases. 
The purpose of this review is to apply information from mul-
tiple domains of psychological science (e.g., cognitive, social, 
methological, clinical) to identify and better understand bias in 
forensic mental health assessment. This topic is ripe for discus-
sion as several studies have investigated potential bias in the 
work of forensic experts. For example, Murrie, Boccaccini, and 
colleagues published compelling data documenting the “alle-
giance effect” in forensic assessments (see, e.g., Murrie, Boccac-
cini, Guarnera, & Rufino, 2013). Their data suggest that adver-
sarially retained experts tend to interpret data and score certain 
psychological assessment instruments in ways that are more 
likely to support the retaining party’s position. 
We begin by defining bias. Then we review evidence for bias 
in forensic mental health practice in the context of rich research 
and theory on judgment and decision making. Along the way, 
we offer examples of how various theories of bias can help us 
explain common problems in interpretation and judgment that 
confront forensic examiners. This leads us to ask how we can use 
what we know about bias in clinicians’ judgment to find ways 
to reduce it. We describe various approaches to the problem 
and offer ideas that may stimulate research on interventions to 
mitigate the negative effects of bias in forensic evaluators’ deci-
sion-making processes.
Defining Bias
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2012), the word 
bias was first documented in the mid-16th century. It has roots in 
the French biais, which is perhaps based on the Greek epikarsios, 
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Abstract
We integrate multiple domains of psychological science to identify, better understand, and manage the effects of subtle but powerful biases 
in forensic mental health assessment. This topic is ripe for discussion, as research evidence that challenges our objectivity and credibility 
garners increased attention both within and outside of psychology. We begin by defining bias and provide rich examples from the judg-
ment and decision-making literature as they might apply to forensic assessment tasks. The cognitive biases we review can help us explain 
common problems in interpretation and judgment that confront forensic examiners. This leads us to ask (and attempt to answer) how we 
might use what we know about bias in forensic clinicians’ judgment to reduce its negative effects.
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for “oblique.” Bias was originally used to describe both a slant-
ing line (i.e., the diagonal in a square) and a curve, such as the 
shape given to the side of a bowl or the curve of a cheek, as 
used by Shakespeare, “Thy sphered Bias cheeke” (1609, Troilus 
& Cressida IV, vi.8). It also was used to refer to the oblique mo-
tion of a loaded bowling ball (as well as to the asymmetric con-
struction of the bowling ball by loading one side with lead), ex-
emplified by Shakespeare’s passage: “Well, forward, forward 
thus the bowle should run. And not unluckily against the bias” 
(1596, The Taming of the Shrew IV, v. 25, as cited by Keren & Tei-
gen, 2004). The word was also used in the fabric industry to re-
fer to cutting diagonally across the grain, “cut along the bias,” 
and in cooking as well; for instance, slicing a carrot at a sharp 
angle increases the surface area of each slice and is thought to 
be visually appealing for food presentation. 
These two uses of the term bias capture different meanings. 
It can be used to describe deviations from the norm (as with mo-
tion of the loaded bowling ball) or slanting one way rather than 
another (like the diagonal line). Error in judgment is not neces-
sarily indicated, although the term as used today often carries 
a negative connotation. Keren and Teigen (2004) point out the 
distinction between bias being a cause versus an effect, noting 
that the word is also used in both of these ways. For example, 
the bias of the bowling ball can be in its shape or loading, caus-
ing it to curve (i.e., the cause), or it can refer to the trajectory of 
the ball (i.e., the effect). 
In the forensic mental health field, the word bias carries a 
negative connotation often associated with an inappropriate 
personal or emotional involvement on the part of the evalua-
tor (Neal, 2011). Bias may be outside the examiner’s awareness 
(i.e., implicit), but examiners may also be accused of purpose-
fully putting a “spin” on the evaluation (i.e., explicit bias). The 
insightful and purposeful spin may not be the biggest challenge 
facing forensic mental health professionals. Evaluators who en-
gage in explicit bias are likely to be recognized by their col-
leagues—in both the mental health and legal fields—as “hired 
guns” with reduced credibility as trustworthy experts. Rather, 
the bigger challenge for the field (and for individual forensic 
practitioners) is likely in understanding and dealing with im-
plicit bias in the way we process and interpret information and 
reach conclusions. Although we acknowledge that explicit bi-
ases deserve attention, this review focuses primarily on the way 
in which examiners’ thinking and decision making may be sys-
tematically affected by implicit biases. 
West and Kenny (2011) drew from multiple domains of psy-
chology to create a single, integrative framework for the study 
of bias and accuracy. It is called the Truth and Bias (T&B) Model 
of judgment. Their T&B model provides theoretical definitions 
and parameters of interest in the study of accuracy and bias. 
It can be used to streamline science’s basic understanding of 
how these constructs operate independent of the researcher’s 
a priori field or theoretical reference point. The model they de-
veloped can be applied widely across psychological domains, 
including forensic psychology. West and Kenny’s (2011) defi-
nition of bias, which we adopt in the present review, is any sys-
tematic factor (i.e., not random error) that determines judgment 
other than the truth. 
Given this definition of bias, what evidence do we have 
that it influences forensic practitioners in their work? And how 
might we understand these influences on forensic practitio-
ners? Fortunately, there is a rich body of judgment and decision-
making research that may provide the theoretical frameworks 
we need for explaining various cognitive biases that underlie 
human cognition. These theoretical frameworks may help us 
bridge the gap to designing studies that could reduce bias in 
forensic decision making.
Biases That May Affect Forensic Experts
Forensic assessment tasks present a tall order. Otto (2013) 
vividly outlined the difficulties faced by forensic clinicians (em-
phasis in original): 
To ( in a limited amount of time, using assessment tech-
niques of limited validity, and with a limited amount of 
information-some of which is provided by persons with 
an investment in the examiner forming a particular opin-
ion) come to an accurate assessment about the past, 
current, and/or future emotional, behavioral, and/
or cognitive functioning of an examinee as it relates 
to some issue before the legal decision maker ( while 
ensuring that how one has been involved in the case does 
not affect one’s decisions). 
Forensic evaluators are asked to gather comprehensive data 
with regard to the referral issue, to analyze the patterns and in-
terrelationships among the various pieces of data (called config-
ural analysis), and then interpret the data to reach an opinion that 
will assist the trier-of-fact (see, e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012). How-
ever, human brains do not have an endless capacity for process-
ing information. Simon (1956) called this constraint “bounded 
rationality”: we do the best we can within the design of our cog-
nitive machinery. As a consequence, people often use cognitive 
shortcuts or simplifying strategies to manage cognitive load. 
There are two traditions of research with regard to human 
cognitive capacities (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). The Heuristics 
and Biases (HB) tradition, which developed first, has focused 
on the limitations of and systematic errors in human cognition 
(see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman, 2011; Kahn-
eman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). The Naturalistic Decision Mak-
ing (NDM) tradition developed in part in reaction to HB’s nar-
row focus on problems in human cognition. NDM has focused 
on the strengths and evolutionary adaptiveness of human cogni-
tive capacities (see, e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). For instance, NDM researchers 
argue our brains have adapted to process information in a fast 
and frugal way—quickly making sense of the vast amount of 
information with which we are constantly faced (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). 
Kahneman and Tversky, the founders of the HB tradition, 
showed humans’ decision-making processes are much more 
prone to error than was previously imagined. Bias, as used in 
the HB tradition, is a byproduct of mental shortcuts called heu-
ristics. Heuristics are decision aids that proceed along “rules of 
thumb,” used by people to arrive at efficient answers especially 
when solutions are not readily apparent. It shares the same root 
as the word eureka (Kahneman, 2011). The mechanisms under-
lying heuristics are incomplete, but they are adequate for most 
situations and usually assist people in arriving at valid answers 
while preserving mental resources (Keren & Teigen, 2004). Heu-
ristics provide an adaptive pathway for humans to cope with 
limited processing capacities (i.e., an evolutionary strength ac-
cording to NDM researchers), but the incomplete nature of heu-
ristic methods means they can lead to error-proneness due to 
systematic biases under some circumstances (i.e., a limitation 
according to HB researchers). 
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Heuristic “answers” can be thought of as approximations of 
the truth. Theoretically, the truth could be discovered after an 
exhaustive step-by-step method of testing various possible so-
lutions and arriving at the correct answer. Einstein (1905), for 
example, called his first Nobel Prize-winning paper on quan-
tum physics, “On a Heuristic Point of View toward the Emission 
and Transformation of Light.” He used the term heuristic rather 
than theory to indicate that his new idea was an initial approxi-
mation that should be further explored (Keren & Teigen, 2004). 
There is a rich literature on various heuristics and biases that 
affect human thinking processes. Since Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s work in the 1970s, the number of “new” heuristics and bi-
ases has proliferated, although it is not always clear that the new 
discoveries are distinct from earlier-identified ones. As such, we 
have organized this section by focusing on three major heuris-
tics that were among those first discovered and discussed: rep-
resentativeness, availability, and anchoring (Keren & Teigen, 
2004). We provide examples of ways they might influence the 
judgment and decision making of forensic mental health exam-
iners (see Table 1).1 Most of the research we review is from the 
judgment and decision-making literature, and it may or may not 
translate to the tasks performed by forensic evaluators. How-
ever, given that forensic evaluators are human, there are rea-
sons to think these principles might apply. One purpose of this 
review is to stimulate research on the biases as they may affect 
forensic clinicians. 
Representativeness
The representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) is a mental shortcut in which the 
subjective probability of an event or sample is estimated based 
on its similarity to a class of events or a typical specimen. If X 
looks like a typical representation of Y, it may easily be per-
ceived as an example of Y, even if Y is improbable. The vignette 
with which we began this paper provides an example. Although 
a defendant found NGI is much more likely to have a psychotic 
disorder than a personality disorder, the limited information 
provided about Mr. Jones characterizes him as a more stereo-
typic representation of a man with Antisocial Personality Dis-
order than a man with a psychotic disorder. 
Think about this next example: 
John P. is a meek man, 42 years old, married with two 
children. His neighbors describe him as mild-man-
nered but somewhat secretive. He owns an import-ex-
port company based in New York City, and he travels 
frequently to Europe and the Far East. Mr. P. was con-
victed once for smuggling precious stones and metals 
(including uranium) and received a suspended sen-
tence of 6 months in jail and a large fine. Mr. P. is cur-
rently under police investigation. Please rank the fol-
lowing statements by the probabilities that they will be 
among the conclusions of the investigation. Remember 
that other possibilities exist and that more than one 
statement may be true. Use 1 for the most probable 
statement, 2 for the second, and so forth
__ Mr. P. is a child molester.
__ Mr. P. is involved in espionage and the sale of secret 
documents.
__ Mr. P. is a drug addict.
__ Mr. P. killed one of his employees.
__ Mr. P. killed one of his employees to prevent him from 
talking to the police.
Does it seem like the last statement is more likely than the 
second-to-last statement? If so, your brain has made an intuitive 
but incorrect judgment by disregarding a basic law of probabil-
ity: the conjunction rule. The probability of a conjunction, P(A&B) 
cannot exceed the probabilities of its elements, P(A) and P(B). In 
this particular example, the addition of a possible motive in the 
last statement (“to prevent him from talking to the police”) re-
duces the probability of the last statement compared to the sec-
ond-to-last statement (because Mr. P might have killed his em-
ployee for a variety of other reasons). Therefore, if the A in this 
equation represents killing the employee to prevent him from 
talking to the police, and if B is all potential reasons for killing 
Table 1. List and Definition of Various Cognitive Biases in Forensic Assessment
Bias  Related biases  Definition
Representativeness   Overemphasizing evidence that resembles a typical representation of a prototype.
 Conjunction fallacy  A compound event is judged more likely than is one of its elements alone.
 Base rate neglect Judging an outcome’s likelihood without considering information about the actual probability 
   that it will occur.
Availability   Overestimating the probability of an occurrence when other instances are relatively  
easy  
   to recall.
 Confirmation bias  Selectively gathering and interpreting evidence that confirms a hypothesis and ignoring 
  evidence that might disconfirm it.
 WYSIATI (What You  Activated information is organized to derive the most coherent “story” possible 
     See Is All There Is)   (non-activated information is left out).
Anchoring   Information encountered first is more influential than information encountered later.
 Framing/Context  Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how or by  
   whom that information is presented.
1 Heuristics are constructs used to describe cognitive processes by which we quickly summarize and make sense of data. Ironically, the way we discuss 
these various heuristics actually function as heuristics themselves. Also, our organization of these data is not the only way they can be organized. 
Some of the heuristics we have subsumed under one of these three major heuristics could arguably fit equally well under one or more of the others.
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the employee, then A cannot equal more than A + B. Tversky 
and Kahenman (1983), using this example, found that many peo-
ple ranked the last statement as more likely than the second-to-
last. They termed this easy-to-make error the conjunction fallacy. 
These findings are relevant to the work of forensic evalu-
ators in many ways. Suppose, for instance, that a 16-year old 
evaluee presents with symptoms of Attention Deficit-Hyperac-
tivity Disorder (ADHD) and Bipolar Disorder, a not uncommon 
occurrence, because the diagnostic criteria overlap. Given the 
conjunction rule, it is most likely the evaluee would not have 
both disorders even if it appears so. The point here is that fo-
rensic evaluators should critically evaluate their decisions to 
diagnose both—the evaluee could indeed have both disorders 
and their life could be impaired incrementally by each disor-
der. However, if the same pieces of data are being used to sup-
port both diagnoses (e.g., counting distractibility and excessive 
activity toward both), then perhaps the evaluator is in error by 
diagnosing both.
As can be seen in these examples, the representativeness heu-
ristic can easily lead to base rate neglect. A base rate is the fre-
quency with which a thing occurs. Base rate neglect is a ubiqui-
tous phenomenon that affects laypeople and professionals alike. 
For example, Casscells, Schoenberger, and Graboys (1978) asked 
Harvard Medical School faculty, staff, and 4th-year medical stu-
dents the following question: 
If a test to detect a disease whose prevalence is 1/1000 
has a false positive rate of 5%, what is the chance that 
a person found to have a positive result actually has 
the disease, assuming that you know nothing about the 
person’s symptoms or signs? _____%
The correct Bayesian answer under the most plausible in-
terpretation of the problem is about 2%.2 Specifically, 51 peo-
ple out of 1000 would test positive (1 true positive and 50 false 
positives). Of the 51 people with positive tests, 1 would actually 
have the disease. Expressed as a proportion, this is 1/51 = 0.019 
or 1.9%. But only 18% of the Harvard-affiliated participants had 
an answer close to 2%. Forty-five percent of this distinguished 
group said the answer was 95%, thereby completely neglecting 
the base rate information. 
An internationally recognized forensic psychiatrist made this 
error in the John Hinckley trial. On cross examination, the de-
fense expert witness testified that Mr. Hinckley’s brain had a 
particular brain anomaly in which his sulci were wider than nor-
mal, evidence the expert offered to support his conclusion that 
Mr. Hinckley had schizophrenia. On cross-examination: 
Q: Isn’t it true that the studies you are talking about in-
dicate that most people who are schizophrenic don’t 
have widened sulci? 
A: To be precise about the word ‘most:’ In one study 
from St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, one third of the schizo-
phrenics had widened sulci. That is a high figure. It is 
true that the simple majority didn’t, but the fact that 
one third had these widened sulci—whereas in nor-
mals, probably less than one out of 50 have them—
that is a powerful fact. 
Q: That is a fact? 
A: Yes . . . It is a statistical fact, as I mentioned, that one 
third of schizophrenics have widened sulci and prob-
ably less than two per cent of the normal people have 
them. That is a powerful statistical fact and it would 
bear on the opinion in this case (Caplan, 1984, as cited 
by Linder, n.d.). 
We can use Bayesian reasoning to calculate the likelihood 
of having schizophrenia, given the presence of the brain anom-
aly. The base rate of schizophrenia in the general population is 
approximately 0.5% (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Given the base rate, 50 out of every 10,000 people would have 
schizophrenia. According to the expert, of those 50 people with 
schizophrenia, one third, or approximately 17 people, would 
have widened sulci. Of the 10,000 people, 9,950 would not have 
schizophrenia. Of the 9,950 people without schizophrenia, 1 out 
of 50, or 199 people, would have widened sulci. Thus, the num-
ber of people with widened sulci would be 216 (17 + 199). Of 
the 216 people with widened sulci, 17 would have schizophre-
nia. Expressed in a proportion, 17/216 = 0.078 or 7.8% of peo-
ple with widened sulci would have schizophrenia. Thus, we can 
see that the expert’s conclusion about the evidence being “pow-
erful” did not appear to account for the low base rate of schizo-
phrenia in the population. 
An example more typical of routine forensic practice may in-
volve the assessment of future violence or recidivism risk, both 
of which have relatively low base rates in some forensic pop-
ulations (e.g., roughly 10%; Campbell & DeClue, 2010; Mona-
han, Steadman, Robbins et al., 2005). The lower the base rate, the 
more challenging the assessment becomes, because even when 
evaluators use evidence-based tools, the tools are limited by the 
base rates. Campbell and DeClue (2010), for example, demon-
strated what would happen if an evaluator used a very good 
sexual offense recidivism assessment tool (the Static-99; Han-
son & Thornton, 1999) to estimate relative likelihood of future 
violence of 100 different evaluees. If the base rate was 19% (this 
is the base rate used in the example by Campbell and DeClue), 
and if the evaluator “bet the base rates” and predicted that all of 
these 100 people would be at very low risk to sexually reoffend 
within a 10-year period, the evaluator would be correct about 
81% of the time. They asked whether employing the Static-99 
could improve the accuracy of the assessment. They demon-
strated that the overall accuracy to classify risk when using the 
measure would be about 76%, a decrease in overall accuracy 
compared to relying on the base rate alone. The lower the base 
rate (e.g., if it is 10% rather than 19%), the worse the predictions 
will be, compared to “betting the base rates.” 
2 Bayesian analysis is a modern approach to statistics named after an 18th-century English reverend named Thomas Bayes. He is credited with de-
veloping rules to explain how people should change their mind in light of evidence, as the evidence becomes available (Kahneman, 2011). For ex-
ample, suppose a colleague told you they just finished meeting with an attorney about a potential new referral. Not knowing anything else about 
the attorney, you should believe that the probability that the attorney was a woman is 33.3% (this is the base rate of women in the legal profes-
sion; American Bar Association [ABA], 2013). Now suppose your colleague told you that s/he was impressed because the attorney was a manag-
ing partner at one of the largest law firms in the U.S. Taking into account this new information, where the base rate of women as managing part-
ners in one of the 200 largest law firms in the U.S. is only 4% (ABA, 2013), then Bayes’ theorem says you should believe that the probability that 
the attorney was a woman is now 2.04%. Although the equation is not listed out here, the example is included to demonstrate the importance of 
base rates in determining the probability of an occurrence. 
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In clinical contexts, experts often underutilize or ignore base 
rate information and tend to rely instead on case-specific infor-
mation (Carroll, 1977; Faust & Faust, 2012; Nickerson, 2004). 
The problem with this practice is that salient but less predictive 
case-specific information can draw the clinician’s attention away 
from the relevant base rates and have the adverse effect of de-
creasing accuracy (see, e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012). Base rates are 
critical and should be part of a forensic evaluator’s thinking pro-
cesses whenever possible. 
Availability
The availability heuristic refers to the ease with which one 
can recall other examples of the event in question, which in-
creases the likelihood of an interpretation (Tversky & Kahne-
man, 1973, 1974). In an early description of this heuristic, the 
philosopher David Hume (1976 [1736]) described the human 
tendency to judge an event’s probability by how “fresh” it is in 
memory. Other factors that increase availability are frequency 
and salience. For example, consider the task forensic clinicians 
are asked to conduct in violence or sexual offending risk assess-
ments. A false negative occurs when a person is assessed as un-
likely to reoffend but does in fact reoffend. Imagine a high-pro-
file reoffense ending up in the newspaper, the evaluator being 
asked by the local news media, “How could you have missed 
this,” and the evaluator’s employer undertaking a performance 
review of his or her work as a result. False negatives are likely 
to be much more memorable than a false positive (i.e., assessed 
as likely to reoffend but does not). The perceived likelihood of 
future reoffending might be overestimated due to the availabil-
ity of information about instances in which a clinician was in-
correct and the salience of anticipated regret. 
Before reading further, please complete this exercise. 
There is a set of cards. On Side 1 is a letter and on Side 
2 is a number. The following hypothesis is proposed: 
“Whenever there is an A on Side 1, there is a 2 on Side 2.” 
Please look at these 4 cards, two with Side 1 exposed 
and two with Side 2 exposed: 
The question is: how many cards, and which ones, could 
you turn over to effectively test the hypothesis?
If you make an error, you’ll be in good company. Most peo-
ple (even trained scientists and professionals like both of the 
authors of this paper) have trouble correctly answering this 
question. The answer is 2. Two cards can effectively test the hy-
pothesis: the “A” and “1” cards. Finding a “1” on the back of the 
“A” would allow you to reject the hypothesis, as would find-
ing an “A” on the back of the “1” card. No other possibilities 
would reject the hypothesis (task adapted from Wason, 1968). 
Turning over “B” will not do it because it is not relevant to the 
hypothesis—no matter what is on the other side, it will not be 
helpful for testing the hypothesis. Turning over the “2” will not 
allow you to reject the hypothesis either; seeing an “A” on the 
reverse side would only confirm the hypothesis, and seeing a 
“B” would not tell you anything about the hypothesis. If you 
thought the “2” should be turned over, you engaged in a cogni-
tive error called the positive test strategy (Klayman & Ha, 1987). 
Positive test strategy is a mental heuristic whereby hypotheses 
are tested exclusively (or primarily) by searching for evidence 
that has the best chance of verifying current beliefs, rather than 
those that have the best chance of falsifying them. And the evi-
dence suggests that this kind of bias is pervasive, even in the ab-
sence of any particular outcome motivations (Fischhoff & Beyth-
Marom, 1983; MacCoun, 1998). 
How is this example of positive test strategy relevant to fo-
rensic practice? It demonstrates the confirmation bias, which may 
plague forensic clinicians. Confirmation bias is a set of tenden-
cies to seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to ex-
isting beliefs, expectations, or hypotheses (Nickerson, 1998). 
Turning over cards to confirm the hypothesis is not an effec-
tive method of testing the hypothesis because ruling out the 
possibility that something is false is a step toward demonstrat-
ing its truth.3 The ubiquity of this error has important implica-
tions for forensic evaluators. Mackay’s compelling line demon-
strates this bias well (1932 [1852], p. 552), “When men wish to 
construct or support a theory, how they torture facts into their 
service!” (Women, too.) 
Clinicians may make conclusions based on inadequately 
formed hypotheses, they may not gather the necessary data 
needed to adequately test their hypotheses, and they may seek 
and rely mainly or exclusively on information that confirms 
their “hunch.” Imagine that you have returned from vacation 
to find a new evaluation assignment in your box that is due in 
just a few days. In this case, you might be more likely to gen-
erate a “hunch” quickly (maybe within the first few minutes of 
meeting with the evaluee), then look for information that would 
confirm your intuition. Doing so means you can finish your 
evaluation and report quickly. Even in less time-sensitive cir-
cumstances, evaluators may engage in these behaviors because 
doing so means the work gets done more quickly and it is less 
effort-intensive than methodically testing alternative hypothe-
ses and seeking information that might disprove one’s intuition.
An evaluator’s initial hypothesis or hunch might be made 
based on the evaluator’s own personal and political beliefs, ex-
posure to pretrial publicity (e.g., suggestibility and expectancy), 
or comments from the referral party regarding their hypothe-
ses about the defendant’s mental health. For instance, imagine 
a defense attorney calls to tell you about a case and see if you 
are interested in the referral. The attorney says, “I have this re-
ally mentally ill guy who is being railroaded by the system” as 
compared to a prosecutor who calls about the same case and 
says, “This guy is faking—there’s no way he’s sick. We need 
your help to prove it.” Other examples involve information aris-
ing from the institutional environment. For example, imagine 
conducting an annual evaluation for an NGI acquittee to help 
the court determine whether s/he continues to meet commit-
ment criteria. If you work in this institution, you might have re-
peatedly heard about how “crazy” or “dangerous” the patient 
is from numerous coworkers, which might influence the way 
you perceive the evaluee and the conclusions you reach. All of 
these sources of opinion can have subtle effects that set up the 
potential for confirmation bias.
3 This principle is rooted in Karl Popper’s (1959) principle of falsificationism. Popper argued that whereas induction could never confirm a hypoth-
esis, induction might permit one to falsify it (e.g., If p then q; not q; therefore, not p) (MacCoun, 1998). Popper contended that falsification permits 
us to weed out bad ideas while seeing how our leading hypotheses hold up under attack (MacCoun, 1998). 
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Confirmation bias may also occur as a result of sharing a 
preliminary opinion before the evaluation is complete. For in-
stance, forensic mental health clinicians might be asked to an-
swer questions about the way they are “leaning” in a case based 
on their initial interpretation of partially collected data (by re-
taining parties, supervisors, colleagues). Answering such ques-
tions prematurely commits the examiner in a way that makes it 
more difficult to resist confirmation bias when completing the 
final interpretation of one’s data.
Confirmation bias may range on a continuum from unmoti-
vated on the examiner’s part (see, e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012) to 
motivated (see, e.g., Festinger, 1957; Kunda, 1990). Motivated 
reasoning may allow an evaluator to arrive at a particular de-
sired conclusion, constrained only by the evaluator’s ability to 
construct reasonable justifications for their conclusion (Kunda, 
1990). In a recent study, Mannes and Moore (2013) demonstrated 
that people tended to do a poor job of adequately adjusting their 
initial estimates after subsequently receiving relevant new infor-
mation or information about the consequences of being wrong. 
They concluded that people, driven by their subjective confi-
dence, tend to have unwarranted and excessive faith in the accu-
racy of their own judgments. Dana, Dawes, and Peterson (2013) 
showed that interviewers who used unstructured interviews 
were able to “make sense” out of virtually anything the inter-
viewee said (even when the responses were nonsense because 
the interviewee answered questions using a random response 
system). The interviewers formed interview impressions just as 
confidently after getting random responses as they did when 
they got real responses. 
WYSIATI (What You See Is All There Is) is a heuristic concept 
describing an apparent design feature of the human brain: only 
activated ideas are processed within a given cognitive task or 
decision-making procedure (Kahneman, 2011). Information 
that is not retrieved while a person analyzes or interprets in-
formation might as well not exist. Our brains are designed to 
create the most coherent explanation out of the available infor-
mation, and it is the consistency of the information that matters 
rather than its completeness (Kahneman, 2011). This design 
feature can also lead to systematic biases (e.g., base rate ne-
glect, overconfidence, confirmation bias), which is what makes 
searching for disconfirming information so difficult. WYSIATI 
is relevant to explain how forensic evaluators form hypothe-
ses, how they search for information to test their hypotheses, 
how they interpret the information they uncover, how they 
reach a decision, and how they communicate that informa-
tion to the trier of fact. 
Let us return to the opening example about Mr. Jones. There 
were at least 13 discrete pieces of information in the vignette. 
How many pieces of information can you recall about him (try 
first without looking)? Although this question is somewhat rel-
evant to forensic clinician’s tasks, the more relevant question is 
how many pieces of information, and which ones, would you 
be thinking about when trying to integrate the data to reach a 
conclusion about the referral question (mental state at time of 
offense)?
Faust and Faust (2012) describe this process of “config-
ural analysis” (trying to integrate all the information gath-
ered, analyzing the patterns of interrelationships among the 
various pieces of data), and they note that studies of human 
information processing suggest forensic clinicians are likely 
to be able to analyze the patterns of interrelationships only 
for about four discrete pieces of information at a time. This 
is how WYSIATI works in real life. Clinicians are limited by 
the “bounded rationality” of being a human being—we are 
all constrained by the limitations of our brain’s design. Even 
if forensic clinicians do their due diligence and identify more 
than four pieces of critical information relevant to the referral 
question, when it comes to formulating their “bottom line,” fo-
rensic clinicians likely focus on the four(ish) pieces of informa-
tion they interpret as most relevant to the question (whether 
they realize it or not). 
Anchoring
The anchoring effect is a cognitive phenomenon in which we 
are overly influenced by initial information encountered (Tver-
sky & Kahneman, 1974). Anchoring, akin to priming and the 
halo effect, increases the weight of first impressions sometimes 
to the point that subsequent information is mostly wasted 
(Kahneman, 2011). The sequence in which we encounter in-
formation is often determined by chance, but it matters. Foren-
sic evaluators who perform child custody evaluations, for ex-
ample, may be well aware of what happens in speaking with 
one party at a time. Imagine first meeting with the mother, 
who presents as a smart, articulate, attractive 35-year old pro-
fessional. She comes across as nondefensive, fully capable of 
parenting safely and competently, and tells you that her child’s 
father is domineering, emotionally abusive to herself and their 
daughter, and that he is dragging out the custody battle out of 
spite. You are struck by how likable and credible she is, and 
before you even meet with the father, you may have a pretty 
sound “hunch.” Now imagine the counterfactual, in which you 
meet with the father, who presents as a smart, articulate, at-
tractive 35-year old professional. He comes across as nonde-
fensive, fully capable of parenting safely and competently, and 
tells you that his child’s mother is domineering, emotionally 
abusive to himself and their daughter, and that she is dragging 
out the custody battle out of spite. You are struck by how lik-
able and credible he is. 
Any forensic evaluator might hear a coherent and compel-
ling story told by the first person interviewed and begin to for-
mulate hypotheses about the case, only to hear a different (and 
perhaps contradictory) story later from another party that might 
be just as coherent and compelling. Unfortunately, people of-
ten have difficulty sufficiently adjusting an original hypothe-
sis based on information encountered later. The evaluator must 
somehow make sense of the contradictory information and be-
ware the anchoring effect of the information from the first party 
the evaluator happened to interview.
Framing and context effects are particularly relevant to foren-
sic work. Framing is a cognitive heuristic in which people tend 
to reach conclusions based on the framework within which the 
situation was presented (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). People 
may draw different conclusions on the basis of the same infor-
mation, depending on how the information was framed or the 
context in which it was delivered. There is a built-in system of 
framing inherent in adversarial legal systems. The recent body 
of research on adversarial allegiance in forensic experts, which 
shows that mental health professionals may reach conclusions 
and opinions consistent with the goals of their retaining party 
(see, e.g., Murrie, Boccaccini, Johnson, & Janke, 2008; Murrie et 
al., 2009; Murrie et al., 2013), might be interpreted with regard 
to this bias. 
Building on their previous body of work, Murrie and col-
leagues (2013) conducted an elegant scientific experiment 
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that demonstrated this effect. They “hired” forensic psychi-
atric and psychological experts to review a defendant’s case 
file and score the offender on two commonly used, well-re-
searched risk assessment instruments. The experts were led to 
believe they had either been hired by the defense or the prose-
cution. That is, the manipulated independent variable was the 
adversarial “side” for which experts thought they were work-
ing (case and offender materials were held constant). Experts 
who believed they were working for the defense tended to as-
sign lower scores on the risk instruments than experts who be-
lieved they were working for the prosecution. The effect sizes 
were up to d = .85 (large effects). 
Murrie and colleagues attributed the adversarial allegiance 
effect directly to experts’ beliefs about for whom they were 
working, because they controlled for other possible explana-
tions. The substantive information provided about the defen-
dant was constant, so differences in the way the examinee pre-
sented could not have explained the findings. Furthermore, they 
eliminated the overt verbal influence often provided by the re-
ferral party in routine forensic practice that contributes to con-
firmation bias. This design element is important: their findings 
show that even when there is no overt framing by a referral 
party, there is still an insidious yet potentially potent form of 
anchoring due to adversarial allegiance.
Can We Reduce Bias in Forensic Practice?
We have reviewed how psychological science has come to 
better understand subtle but powerful sources of bias in human 
decision making. We focused the review especially on cognitive 
processes that might threaten the accuracy of forensic clinicians’ 
thinking when they are formulating their hypotheses during or 
after acquiring evaluation data. Throughout the review, we pro-
vided examples to show how forensic examiners’ use of evalu-
ation data could potentially fall prey to subtle sources bias and 
error that can affect their conclusions.
We now pose the question, “Should we be concerned?” Let 
us accept the existence of such potential sources of bias in judg-
ment and decision making. Let us presume that forensic mental 
health examiners, like other humans, are susceptible to heuris-
tic and other cognitive sources of bias in their processing of in-
formation. Is there reason for forensic mental health assessment 
as a field, and forensic examiners individually, to take this on as 
a problem? Or should we accept our inevitable human fallibil-
ity while taking the lessons simply as a warning that we must 
“exercise due caution?”
We think there are good reasons to be concerned. Scientific 
and clinical expertise in the courtroom is dependent on the ex-
pectancy that the expert seeks accuracy and avoids anything that 
may lead to bias in the collection or interpretation of data. Chal-
lenging that expectancy is a growing body of research suggest-
ing that forensic examiners differ in the data they collect and the 
opinions they reach, depending on the social contexts in which 
they are involved in forensic cases (e.g., Brown, 1992; Deitch-
man, 1991; Homant & Kennedy, 1986, 1987a, 1987b; Murrie et 
al., 2013; Neal, 2011; Svec, 1991). These studies are identifying 
the results of error, bias, and inaccuracy in our work. And deci-
sion-making science offers plausible ways to explain it. 
Failure to address the questions runs counter to our profes-
sional obligation to be accountable for our performance and to 
strive for the integrity of our opinions. Moreover, failure to ad-
dress the questions degrades our perceived credibility.
Framing the Problem
As one considers the theories of bias in decision making, it 
is apparent that the ultimate objectives are (a) to explain ways 
in which human decisional processes fail to achieve accuracy 
and (b) uncover means of correcting the errors to improve ac-
curacy. These objectives parallel the psychometric notion of va-
lidity. We might ask how bias and error detract from achieving 
valid answers to forensic referral questions. However, for most 
forensic questions, there is no obvious criterion variable repre-
senting the “truth,” no touchstone with which to evaluate the 
validity of our answers to the questions.
An imperfect substitute for improving our validity is to im-
prove our reliability, at least as an initial goal (see, e.g., Moss-
man, 2013). We might propose that two clinicians should arrive 
at similar clinical assessments. That sameness—the essence of re-
liability—can be our touchstone as we explore the influences of 
bias on forensic opinions. This would not necessarily mean the 
two clinicians arrived at the right opinion. Reliability does not 
guarantee validity; it merely assures a condition without which 
validity cannot be achieved. 
Given that we frame the problem of cognitive bias and er-
ror in forensic practice as a problem of reliability (at least for 
now), we consider three ways to respond to the problem. One 
of these approaches seeks understanding and the second seeks 
change. The third imagines a paradigm shift with potential to 
mitigate the problem.
Discovering the Extent of the Problem
Recent studies of the opinions of forensic clinicians in cases 
involving multiple experts have identified what they interpret 
as substantial unreliability in those opinions (see, e.g., Boccac-
cini, Turner, & Murrie, 2008; Boccaccini, Turner, Murrie, & Ru-
fino, 2012; Gowensmith, Murrie, & Boccaccini, 2012, 2013; Mur-
rie et al., 2008, 2009, 2013; Murrie, Boccaccini, Zapf, Warren, & 
Henderson, 2008; Murrie & Warren, 2005). Moreover, the unre-
liability appears to be largely related to the examiners’ agency, 
allegiance, and sometimes personality and attitudes. Those stud-
ies tell us something about the conditions in which bias might 
arise, but they do not enlighten us about how bias works. They 
tell us nothing about heuristics and biases at the level of cog-
nitive effort during the collection, sorting, and use of informa-
tion in forensic cases. It is reasonable to hypothesize that the 
types of errors in logic and heuristic thinking described by cog-
nitive science “serve” the social and personal influences that ap-
pear to drive unreliable outcomes. Can we develop a body of 
research that connects variance in forensic opinions with spe-
cific sources of bias or errors in logic during data collection or 
case formulation? 
One type of research would identify whether and how vari-
ous cognitive heuristics occur when forensic clinicians are pro-
cessing data in their case formulation. There is little reason to 
believe that forensic clinicians are any more or less immune to 
heuristics and biases than are any other similarly intelligent de-
cision makers in unstructured decision tasks. Documenting this 
in the context of forensic case formulation, and identifying spe-
cific types of more common biases in processing cases, would 
provide a fundamental start for identifying the extent of the 
problem. A line of research could explore the “dynamics” of 
heuristics and biases in forensic clinicians’ cognitive processing 
of cases. Under what social conditions are the various sources of 
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cognitive bias and error increased or decreased? This research 
might show that conditions of agency, allegiance, or other incen-
tives augment the play of cognitive heuristics and biases when 
formulating cases, offering a cognitive explanation for unreli-
ability in forensic formulations. To what degree do decision aids 
and structured methods decrease bias and improve accuracy?
One of the challenges of this work will be delineating the el-
ements of the “forensic evaluation process” where biases and 
errors may exert an effect. There may be many ways to con-
strue the process, but here we offer a simple one to provide an 
example. The forensic evaluation process begins with a refer-
ral question that guides the evaluation. The evaluation then in-
cludes, (a) selection of types of data to collect, (b) collection of 
the data, (c) analysis of the data, and (d) interpretation of the 
data to formulate a forensic opinion. These domains within the 
evaluation process might allow us to discover how bias works 
in various ways associated with the steps in the process. Con-
sidered respectively, they offer the potential to determine how 
biases (a) narrow or expand our search for relevant data, (b) in-
fluence the quality and integrity of the data that we collect, (c) 
influence how we score or subjectively classify the data we have 
obtained, and (d) influence how we combine the data when test-
ing our hypotheses and their alternatives regarding the answer 
to the forensic question.
Finding Remedies That Overcome Bias
A second way to respond to the problem is to seek ways to 
reduce clinicians’ susceptibility to biases that increase unreli-
ability. One might suppose that the line of research described 
in the first approach—discovering the extent of the problem—
would be a required prelude to the identification of remedial 
strategies. Yet we should consider the possibility that the two 
lines of research could proceed in parallel fashion. Indeed, the 
former studies might sometimes include design features that ex-
plore remedial potentials.
What do we already know about debiasing strategies? The 
decision-making field has described various ways to make 
people aware of the positive and negative effects of heuris-
tics on their decision making (see, e.g., Gawande, 2009; Kahn-
eman, 2011). Indeed, the potential sources of bias described 
earlier in this paper are known to many in business, medicine, 
education, and science. Yet arming people with insight into 
sources of heuristic error does not guarantee that the insights 
will be used. That should not be surprising. Almost all adap-
tive functioning requires not merely knowledge, but also mo-
tivation and practice. At minimum, putting such information 
to use would seem to require a desire to avoid bias and error 
and alertness to conditions in which such bias and error can 
occur (Kahneman, 2011). Efforts to change individuals’ cogni-
tive heuristics could also be fashioned as educational proce-
dures that allow individuals to recognize, practice, and repet-
itively rehearse positive heuristic methods while processing 
information that is relevant for them—in this case, formulat-
ing forensic cases. 
One specific debiasing strategy that has a good chance of 
being useful for forensic clinicians is locating and then keep-
ing in mind relevant base rates (Kahneman, 2011). For exam-
ple, Schwartz, Strack, Hilton, and Naderer (1991) found that in-
structing people to “think like a statistician” enhanced the use of 
base-rate information, whereas instructing people to “think like 
a clinician” had the opposite effect. Kahneman (2011) suggests 
that the corrective procedure is to develop a baseline predic-
tion, which you would make if you knew nothing specific about 
the case (e.g., find the relevant base rate). Second, determine 
whether the base rate matches your clinical judgment about the 
case. When thinking about your clinical judgment, always ques-
tion the strength of the evidence you’ve gathered (How sound 
is the evidence? How independent are the observations? Don’t 
confuse correlation with causation, etc.). Then aim for a conclu-
sion somewhere between the baseline prediction and your clin-
ical judgment (and stay much closer to baseline if the evidence 
underlying the clinical judgment is poor). Clinicians often tend 
to exaggerate the persuasiveness of case-specific information 
(Faust & Faust, 2012; Kahneman, 2011). Therefore, anchoring 
with a base rate and then critically evaluating the strength of the 
case-specific diagnostic information are offered as recommenda-
tions to combat the representativeness heuristic and overconfi-
dence (Kahneman, 2011). 
Another debiasing strategy is to “consider the opposite” 
(Koehler, 1991; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1985). This strategy 
may be particularly useful for forensic clinicians, given the ad-
versarial nature of courtroom proceedings. Expert witnesses 
testify through direct- and cross-examination. Imagining how 
one’s assessment methods, data, and interpretations will be 
scrutinized during cross-examination is often recommended 
as a trial preparation strategy (e.g., Brodsky, 2012). Part of that 
consideration is recognizing that the opposing side will not 
merely attack the proof for the clinician’s opinion, but might 
also pose alternative interpretations and contradictory data, 
asking the clinician why they were rejected. Similarly, Lord 
and colleagues (1985) found that people could mitigate confir-
mation bias when asked a question like, “Consider how you’d 
evaluate the case given opposite results,” while a global moti-
vational instruction to “try to be unbiased” was not an effec-
tive bias mitigation strategy. 
Structure and systematic methods. The notion that observ-
ers’ interpretation of evidence might be influenced by personal 
interests and prejudices dates back at least to Sir Francis Bacon, 
who is credited with advocating the scientific method in the 
16th and 17th centuries (MacCoun, 1998). Structure and sys-
tematic methods are the backbones of the scientific method. 
What do we already know about how structure, standardized 
procedure, and evidence-based decision making improve the 
reliability and validity of forensic evaluations? The closely re-
lated body of research on the poor reliability of clinical judg-
ment sheds light on this question (see, e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012 
for an overview). 
Many studies have shown that structured methods im-
prove forensic assessments as compared to unstructured clin-
ical judgments. For example, in a meta-analysis of recidivism 
risk assessments for sexual offenders, Hanson and Morton-
Bourgon (2009) showed that actuarial measures (such as the 
Static-99) were considerably more accurate than unstructured 
clinical judgment for all outcomes (sexual, violent, or any re-
cidivism). In a meta-analysis of violence risk assessments, 
Guy (2008) found evaluations that employed structured pro-
fessional judgment tools (such as the HCR-20; Webster, Doug-
las, Eaves, & Hart, 1997) and actuarial tools (such as the VRAG; 
Harris, Rice, & Quinsey, 1993) performed better in predicting 
antisocial behavior than assessments that relied on an unstruc-
tured clinical judgment approach. 
These methods might improve forensic evaluations by help-
ing forensic clinicians minimize the effects of biases on their 
work. Research findings have shown that allegiance effects (i.e., 
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assessments scored in the direction that would be preferred by 
the adversarial retaining party) are stronger for more subjective 
measures but attenuated with more structured measures. Murrie 
and colleagues (2009) found that allegiance effects were stron-
ger for the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003), 
a measure that requires more subjective judgments in scoring, 
than for the Static-99, which requires less clinical judgment. In-
terrater agreement between evaluators working for opposing 
parties were stronger for the Static-99 (ICC = 0.64) but weaker 
for the PCL-R (ICC = 0.42). These findings were replicated in the 
2013 paper by Murrie and colleagues. Specifically, effect sizes for 
the allegiance effect with the PCL-R were up to d = 0.85 (large ef-
fect), whereas the effect sizes for the Static-99R (Helmus, Thorn-
ton, Hanson, & Babchishin, 2012) were up to d = 0.42 (small-to-
medium effect). Thus, more structured measures appear to be 
associated with higher interrater agreement rates and lower ad-
versarial allegiance bias. Perhaps more structured measures also 
attenuate the other kinds of biases outlined in this review. Fur-
ther research might inform potential bias-mitigation remedies. 
Another strategy to increase reliability and validity, and 
likely decrease bias, would be to identify approximately four 
to six variables essential to the referral issue at question. The di-
mensions should be as independent as possible from each other, 
and they should be amenable to reliable assessment (they should 
be highly valid, highly reliable indicators). Identifying these es-
sential dimensions for consideration with each kind of referral 
question might decrease the time, money, and other resources 
spent on cases, and might also increase the other quality indica-
tors described above (e.g., Faust & Faust, 2012; Gawande, 2009; 
Kahneman, 2011). 
Take, for example, an evaluator tasked with assessing a de-
fendant’s competency to stand trial (CST) abilities. The few es-
sential variables might include active symptoms of mental ill-
ness (which could be assessed with existing valid and reliable 
measures), intellectual or cognitive capacity (could also be as-
sessed with reliable and valid measures), ability to remain in 
behavioral control or inhibit impulsive behaviors (could be in-
dexed through a review of the defendant’s recent history and 
history during similar episodes, if there have been previous ep-
isodes), and perhaps degree of malingering (could be assessed 
with an existing response style indicator, particularly one de-
veloped to measure CST-related malingering). Although vari-
ables like educational attainment, age, and history of mental 
illness might be related to the referral question, these variables 
are unlikely to be as useful for generating a sound conclusion. 
Educational attainment could be a proxy for cognitive capac-
ity, but measuring the capacity is a more valid and reliable way 
to index this particular trait (and education and cognitive abil-
ities should not both be considered essential variables, because 
they are not as independent of one another as would be ideal). 
History of mental illness might be relevant, but would be less 
relevant than current symptoms of illness. However, particu-
lar behaviors during previous episodes might be essential (e.g., 
demonstrated difficulty inhibiting impulsive verbal and phys-
ical outbursts in previous court appearances during periods of 
active psychosis).
Finally, research might seek to develop an antibias linear or 
branching procedure that clinicians could follow in their prac-
tice, or perhaps “checklists” of essential elements for clinicians 
to systematically consider for various situations. A measure for 
violence risk assessment called the Classification of Violence 
Risk (COVR; Monahan, Steadman, Appelbaum et al., 2005) is 
one example. It relies on classification-tree analysis to allow sev-
eral different variables to be considered together. It produces 
an actuarial estimate of risk, but is intended to be used by cli-
nicians as one piece of information upon which to base conclu-
sions and decisions. This kind of tool and other checklist meth-
ods, like structured professional judgment tools, might guide 
forensic clinicians around the biases that arise in various steps 
of the evaluation process while encouraging positive heuristics. 
Imagining a Systemic Adjustment
The two approaches we have described focus on understand-
ing how forensic examiners think and then potentially modi-
fying their thinking. These approaches consider the problem a 
matter of faulty human performance that requires changing the 
individual. Yet psychology has long recognized that problems in 
human functioning sometimes admit to a different type of anal-
ysis that refocuses the problem as one of person–environment 
fit. If one can change the individual to fit the environment’s de-
mands, sometimes that is preferable. But if that proves too diffi-
cult, one can at least consider whether one can change the envi-
ronment—the context in which the individual must function—to 
reduce the problem.
It is proper, therefore, for our analysis to conclude by imag-
ining the development of a legal context that would mitigate 
the problem of bias in forensic practice. This leads us to con-
sider a context that we do not advocate. We offer it in the form 
of a “thought experiment,” potentially for its “heuristic” value 
as our field searches for creative solutions to the problem of fo-
rensic examiner bias.4 
Forensic experts are expected to use their science to lead 
them to an objective opinion. When two experts in the same 
field arrive at different opinions, judges and juries tend to as-
sume either of two things: The experts’ science is unreliable, 
or the experts used their science in a biased manner. But let us 
imagine a legal system that does not expect forensic clinicians 
to arrive at similar opinions. It expects the forensic experts to 
endeavor to build an argument for a conclusion that favors the 
party that called them, developing the best version possible that 
the available data will allow. In the paradigm we are imagin-
ing, the expert is relieved of the task of finding the explanation 
that most objectively fits the data. It allows the expert to create 
a “favored” interpretation that is consistent with, and not con-
tradicted by, the data. In some cases the expert will find that it 
simply cannot be done. If so, the party is free not to call the ex-
pert to report or testify, and law could shield the expert’s inves-
tigation from discovery. In many cases, the expert will be able to 
build an interpretation of the available data and a conclusion—
sometimes more plausible, sometimes less—that fits the inter-
ests of the party.
One defense of this paradigm rests with the law’s adversar-
ial process of arriving at just decisions when the “truth” is often 
obscure. To resolve disputes, our legal system developed over 
time a structured and transparent process (called due process in 
the U.S.) through which it considers multiple perspectives in an 
adversarial framework. The system’s adversarial framework at-
tempts to achieve fairness through procedural justice (Rawls, 
4 See MacCoun, 1998 for a similar analysis of inquisitorial versus adversarial models of science in his Annual Review of Psychology article called “Bi-
ases in the interpretation and use of research results.” 
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1999). Recognizing that truth may be unknowable in human af-
fairs, it is procedure that matters most, so that if trustworthy pro-
cesses are followed, truth can be closely approximated even if 
it is not attained. In this adversarial framework, the trial pro-
cess relies on two parties to make arguments in favor of their 
opposing opinions. Both parties must investigate the potential 
evidence and construct their interpretation of the evidence that 
best fits their position in the case. This system presumes that 
many fact circumstances can be interpreted in different ways, 
and it makes no presumptions about the differential validity of 
the interpretations. 
The analysis thus far has focused only on the interpretation 
of the data to reach a conclusion. What about the data them-
selves? Is there not a danger that the expert will selectively seek, 
or selectively find, only those data that will support the party’s 
argument? Again we find a possible parallel with the role of at-
torneys in the criminal justice process. They are ethically bound 
to engage in competent practice that offers zealous advocacy for 
their party. Arguably, that ethical obligation is breached when 
an attorney seeks only evidence that will support their party’s 
argument. In doing so, the attorney might well miss data that 
could support the other party’s argument. Having missed it, the 
attorney is unprepared to defend against it, and thus does dam-
age to the party to which allegiance is owed, therefore practic-
ing incompetently.
In this revised forensic-clinical paradigm, the situation of the 
forensic expert working with either party would be much the 
same. The expert is expected to participate in the adversarial 
process (rather than being removed from it) by seeking the best 
interpretation for the party’s conclusion that can be supported 
by the data. But seeking only those data that support the con-
clusion will weaken the plausibility of the interpretation. It will 
not stand up to other data that the opposing party might have 
found and against which the expert will be unprepared to de-
fend. Thus the expert will be ethically obligated to find all data, 
not just data that support the adversarial hypothesis. Moreover, 
those data must be competently and reliably obtained, scored, 
and interpreted in light of past research. Just as attorneys using 
inaccurate information may harm their clients’ interests, so ex-
perts’ unreliable data may do the same.
This approach is often used to stimulate academic debate, 
with two experts constructing the two best opposing theoreti-
cal interpretations they can create using existing observations. 
(In fact, the argument we are currently constructing is based on 
such a model). The matter is somewhat different, though, for 
clinical professionals. Typically they are obligated to arrive at 
opinions in a neutral and objective manner, so that their opin-
ions will avoid error that may harm their patients. In the alter-
native paradigm we outline here, society might assign experts a 
role that does not require neutrality, but rather asks them to ex-
ercise their special expertise to produce the two best-supported 
but perhaps contradictory views of a case.
Forensic examiners’ primary obligation would be (a) accu-
racy in one’s use of objective methods of data collection, (b) in-
tegrity in the description of one’s data, and (c) clarity and hon-
esty in describing the manner in which the data led to one’s 
conclusion. Put another way, one’s data must be reliable, and 
one’s processing of the information (typically called one’s inter-
pretation of the data) must be explained. Given this paradigm, 
reliability between two examiners should be required for (a), 
but would be variable for (b) and (c).
We offer this paradigm shift for further consideration. Un-
doubtedly a more penetrating analysis will find the potential for 
consequential damage in this model. There may also be flaws 
in the analogy, which may or may not be remediable. For ex-
ample, attorneys are obligated to seek all information that may 
support and refute their party’s position, but are they required 
to reveal it? In criminal cases, if prosecutors know of data that 
would harm the state’s position and favor the defendant, they 
must reveal it. Defense attorneys have no such obligation. Our 
legal system’s protection of individual liberty requires the state 
to prove guilt and provides defendants the right to withhold 
information that might incriminate them. Were this to apply to 
experts, the expert for the prosecution would operate much as 
is expected now, revealing all sources and types of information 
that were obtained in the evaluation. But defense experts would 
reveal only the data that they collected that favored the defense, 
while withholding all negative data.
The problems with this are quite evident. For example, if a 
defense expert administered an instrument measuring psycho-
pathic traits, would the score be reported only if it were below 
the psychopathy cut-off? Would we report only psychopathol-
ogy test scores for scales on which the client scored in a direc-
tion favoring the defense argument, while leaving out scores 
on the other scales? Furthermore, how might adopting an ad-
vocacy role affect the examiner’s ability to collect, score, and in-
terpret “objective” tests? Explicit adoption of an adversarial role 
might lead to even greater differences in test data obtained by 
defense and prosecution experts than have been uncovered by 
researchers to date (e.g., Murrie et al., 2013). One potential rem-
edy would be a requirement that the same database be used by 
explicitly adversarial experts. For example, a court-appointed 
psychometrician might administer and score the relevant test 
instruments requested by the adversarial parties, then the ad-
versarial experts might be expected to interpret and make use 
of those data alongside the other data in forming their adver-
sarial conclusions and opinions. Such an approach might max-
imize objectivity (in data collection) but also make best use of 
the adversarial nature of the fact-finding legal justice system. 
Conclusion
Recent studies have examined the relation of personal and 
situational variables, including those that can be explained by 
judgment and decision making science, to forensic examiners’ 
opinions. These studies have provided sufficient evidence of the 
need to address the issue of bias in forensic mental health eval-
uations. Not all agree that the current studies actually indicate 
bias (Mossman, 2013). But there is mounting evidence contrary 
to the notion of random error. We anticipate that increasingly 
we will be held accountable in the courts to explain recent re-
search evidence that challenges our objectivity and credibility. 
Accordingly, we have offered a review of various sources 
of bias in decision making that might provide frameworks and 
concepts for future studies. If these studies provide better un-
derstanding of the phenomenon, we envision the creative de-
velopment of ways that clinicians can reduce the effects of bias 
when they are processing data and arriving at opinions. Finally, 
we imagined a legal context that might change the role of fo-
rensic examiners in a way that accepts adversarial participation 
through expert evidence—a legal context full of practical, sci-
entific, and ethical questions. These questions may or may not 
be worth trying to answer as we strive to improve the validity 
and reliability of forensic mental health evaluations and to fos-
ter trust in our work process and products.
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